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Case No. 20100938 
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
DONNA WHITNEY, individually and as parent and heir of Dillon 
Whitney, deceased, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF JUVENILE JUSTICE SERVICES and 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, 
Defendants/Appellants. 
DEFENDANTS' BRIEF ON CERTIFIED QUESTION OF LAW FROM THE 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 
Defendants, the Utah Department of Human Services and the 
Utah Division of Juvenile Justice Services, submit their brief on a 
certified question of state law. 
Jurisdictional Statement 
The United States District Court for the Tenth Circuit certified a 
single question of state law that this Court accepted. The Court 
possesses original jurisdiction to answer that question under Utah Code 
Ann. § 78A-3-102Q) (West 2009). 
Question Presented 
Is a juvenile delinquent placed in a community-based proctor 
home incarcerated in a place of legal confinement, such that Utah has 
not waived its state sovereign immunity for injuries arising out of, in 
connection with, or resulting from his placement, pursuant to the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act of Utah, Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-
301(5)(j)? 
Standard of Review 
When a federal court certifies a question of state law, this Court 
answers "the legal question[ ] presented without resolving the 
underlying dispute." In re Kunz, 2004 UT 71,1 6, 99 P.3d 793. 
-2-
Determinative Statutory Provision 
The Utah Governmental Immunity Act's incarceration exception 
states: 
(5) Immunity from suit of each 
governmental entity is not waived under 
Subsections (3) and (4) if the injury arises out of, 
in connection with, or results from 
(j) the incarceration of any person in any 
state prison, county or city jail, or other place of 
legal confinement [.] 
Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-301(5)(j) (West Supp. 2009). 
Statement of the Case 
Nature of the Case. 
This case stems from the tragic death of Dillon Whitney, who for 
nearly a year before his death had been committed to custody of Utah's 
Department of Human Services (DHS), Division of Juvenile Justice 
Services (DJJS) for appropriate out-of-home placement. Dillon became 
-3-
injured and died when he fell down a flight of stairs while AWOL from 
his court-ordered proctor placement. Plaintiff sued DHS, DJJS, and 
others, claiming in part that the State negligently approved and 
supervised Dillon's placement. The Utah Governmental Immunity Act 
governs the viability of that claim. Because Plaintiffs alleged injury 
arose out of, and is factually connected to Dillon Whitney's 
incarceration in a place a legal confinement, Defendants retain 
immunity from Plaintiffs negligence suit. Relying chiefly on the Youth 
Corrections Act and inapposite law, a federal district court judge 
determined that because at the time of his death, Dillon Whitney 
resided in a non-secure "community-based program," he was not then 
incarcerated and, Defendants were, accordingly, not immune. 
Defendants ask the Court to reject that interpretation of Utah law. 
Procedural History and Disposition in Federal Court. 
Plaintiff sought damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for an alleged 
substantive due process violation and under Utah law for various acts of 
negligence and for wrongful death. Aplt. App. 15-42, Doc. 2, Amd. 
Compl. Defendants removed the matter to federal court and filed a 
-4-
partial motion to dismiss with supporting memoranda, seeking to 
dismiss Plaintiffs negligence claims and the Section 1983 cause against 
them. Aplt. App. 43-50, 67-74, Doc. 28-29, 47. Plaintiff opposed the 
motion. Aplt. App. 51-66, Doc. 36. The district court heard oral 
argument, after which Defendants submitted corrected memoranda and 
both parties submitted supplemental responses. Aplt. App. 75-90, Doc. 
58, 63-64, 68. The district court entered a memorandum decision and 
order granting Defendants' motion to dismiss the Section 1983 claim, 
but denying Defendants' motion to dismiss the negligence counts. Aplt. 
App. 129-138, Doc. 80. Defendants timely appealed that part of the 
order addressing Plaintiffs negligence claims. Aplt. App. 139-142, Doc. 
83. That matter was fully briefed and the Tenth Circuit held oral 
argument. The Tenth Circuit did not issue a final decision, but it 
certified a single question of Utah law, which this Court accepted. 
Statement of Facts 
For purposes of this brief, Defendants accept as true the following 
facts alleged in the amended complaint. See Healthcare Servs. Grp. Inc. 
v. Utah Dep't of Health, 2002 UT 5, f 3, 40 P.3d 591. 
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In 2006 and 2007, sixteen-year-old Dillon Whitney committed a 
series of delinquent acts1 and was referred to Utah's Third Judicial 
District Juvenile Court. Aplt. App. 20, Amd. Compl. f 25. Dillon 
appeared before the Honorable Andrew Valdez, who adjudicated Dillon 
as delinquent, placed him on probation and committed Dillon to DHS's 
legal custody for out-of-home placement. Id., Amd. Compl. f 26. At 
Judge Valdez' direction, DHS committed Dillon to DJJS's supervision, 
who pursuant to court order, placed Dillon at Journey Ranch, a 
wilderness diversion program. Id., Amd. Compl. f 27. 
Dillon did not complete that program, but in June 2007, DJJS 
removed Dillon from Journey Ranch after he went AWOL on an 
overnight trek. Aplt. App. 21, Amd. Compl. f 29. DJJS committed 
Dillon to the Salt Lake Valley Detention Center (SLVDC) pending a 
court hearing. Id., Amd. Compl. f 30. At a June 22 hearing, Judge 
Valdez continued Dillon in DHS's legal custody and ordered that he 
1
 A delinquent act is an "act which would constitute a felony or misdemeanor if 
committed by an adult." Utah Code Ann. § 62A-7-101(6). 
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remain at the SLVDC for observation and assessment (0 & A). Id., 
Amd. Compl. 1 31. 
Following 0 & A, Judge Valdez directed DJJS to transition Dillon 
to a community-based placement. Id., Amd. Compl. I 34. DJJS 
referred Dillon to co-defendant Quest Youth Services, a private contract 
agency, for proctor placement. Aplt. App. 22, Amd. Compl. f 35. 
Quest, in turn, placed Dillon in the proctor home of co-defendant Henry 
Kafusi, a private contract provider. Id., Compl, f 36. 
Judge Valdez approved Dillon to begin home visits on November 
16, 2007. Aplt. App. 23, Amd. Compl. <j[ 47. A week later, Dillon's DJJS 
caseworker authorized a Thanksgiving home visit from Thursday, 
November 22 through Friday, November 23 at 9:00 p.m.. Id., Amd. 
Compl. M 49-50. 
Dillon did not return from that visit, but went instead to an 
apartment rented by Victor Hernandez. Aplt. App. 23, 24, Amd. Compl. 
ff 51, 54. While there, Dillon fell down a flight of seventeen stairs and 
injured himself. Aplt. App. 24, Amd. Compl. f 55. Dillon's friends and 
Mr. Hernandez helped him back to the apartment, where they placed 
-7-
Dillon on Hernandez' couch. Id., Amd. Compl., f 56. The next day, 
believing him to be dead, Hernandez moved Dillon to an outside 
stairwell. Id., Amd. Compl. f 57. Paramedics were notified and arrived 
at the scene; later, they transported Dillon to a hospital. Id., Amd. 
Compl., f 58. 
Dillon Whitney died on November 25, 2007, while en route to Salt 
Lake Regional Medical Center. Id., Amd. Compl. f 59. Plaintiffs 
amended complaint does not state, but subsequent discovery makes 
clear that Quest did not notify and that no one from DHS or DJJS knew 
Dillon was missing until after he passed away. 
Summary of the Argument 
The State retains immunity when a plaintiffs injury arises out of, 
occurs in connection with, or results from "the incarceration of any 
person in any state prison, county or city jail, or other place of legal 
confinement." Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-301(5)(j). This Court has long-
held that a person is incarcerated under the Act when he or she is 
"under the control of the State," Madsen v. State, 538 P.2d 92, 93 (Utah 
-8-
1978), and unable to "be released [from that control] without some kind 
of permission." Emery v. State, 438 P.2d 1296, 1297 (Utah 1971). 
Dillon Whitney died while in the State's custody and while under 
state control. For nearly a year prior to his death, Dillon had been 
committed to the care and custody of the DHS and subject to ongoing 
out-of-home placement. From the time the juvenile court first 
adjudicated him as a youth offender, until his untimely death, Dillon 
Whitney was subject to juvenile court control and his placement was 
determined according to that court's direction. Dillon Whitney was not 
free to return home or to reside with either parent. And though the 
restrictive nature of Dillon's placements varied, he remained under 
State control, possessing leave to participate in a home visit only 
because Judge Valdez expressly authorized Dillon to do so. 
That outcome stands under the scrutiny of Utah's Youth 
Corrections Act. But for his own delinquent conduct, Dillon Whitney 
was committed to Defendants' custody for out-of-home placement; first 
at a wilderness diversion program, next at the SLVDC, and finally in a 
community-based proctor home. At each, Dillon's liberty was restrained 
-9-
;m<J his conduclcontrolled. Dillon was not free to be leave any 
placement, but was subject to a pick up order and further delinquency 
proceedings should he leave that placement absent a court order. 
Though Dillon Whitney enjoyed more liberty while in proctor care than 
he had known at Journey Ranch or the SLVDC, even there, Dillon was 
incarcerated in a place of legal confinement such that Defendants are 
immune form Plaintiffs negligence suit. This Court should affirm the 
certified question. 
Argument 
Dillon Whitney was Incarcerated in a Place of Legal 
Confinement Such that Defendants Retain Sovereign 
Immunity From Plaintiffs Negligence Suit. 
This ('<<uH consistently acknowledges the necessity of 
governmental immunity in protecting the delivery of vital governmental 
services, and it strictly construes statutory wording to preserve that 
immunity. See Hall v. Utah State Dep't ofCorr., 24 P.3d 958, 96z ; tah 
2001); see also Taylor v. Ogden City Sch. Dist, 927 P.2d 1 !>S), 
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1996); Epting v. State, 546 P.2d 242, 243 (Utah 1976). Here, a federal 
court judge determined that the Utah Legislature waived the State's 
sovereign immunity from Plaintiffs suit, because her injury arose not 
out of Dillon Whitney's secure confinement, but out of his placement at 
a community-based proctor home. That interpretation finds support 
neither in the Immunity Act's plain language nor in this Court's prior 
decisions. The Court should reject it and affirm the certified question. 
A. Dillon Whitney was Incarcerated in a Place of Legal 
Confinement Under a Plain Reading of Utah's 
Immunity Act. 
When interpreting any statute, the Court looks first to the 
statute's plain language, and gives effect to that language unless it is 
ambiguous. See Blackner v. Dep't ofTransp., 48 P.3d 949, 952 (Utah 
2002). The Court's goal, therefore, "is to give effect to the legislature's 
intent and purpose." Grappendorfv. Pleasant Grove City, 2007 UT 84, 
I 9, 173 P.3d 166, 168 (Utah 2007). The Court will not stray from the 
statute's plain meaning when it "is unambiguous and there is no 
compelling reason to believe that the legislature has misspoken." Moss 
v. Pete Suazo Utah Athletic Comm'n, 2007 UT 99, X, 175 P.3d 1042, 
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KM*, i Utah LWMintinu Lyon u. Burton, 2000 UT 19, f 17, 5 P.3d 616 
(Ut.'ihaOOO)). 
The Immi •;.; • >• State's sovereign immunity from 
suit :. : ! • • • - ; . \ connection with, or results from . . 
.:; .the 'rson in any ... place of legal confinement." 
/( *wi T-301(5)(j) (emphasis added). On its face, the Act applies to 
Plaintiffs injury and to shield Defendants from damages causally 
connected to Dillon Whitney's death. 
The Ai I ilui'ii mil <'\i'in|)t minors, but it applies to "the 
incarc^mtion tA'u/iy person." Id. The Act does not carve out an 
except ion for stepped-down, or community-based commitments, but it 
shields the State from suit when a person is "in any place of legal 
confinement." Id. The Act also does not require actual confinement. 
Instead, the State is protected from injuries connected to "legal 
confinement." M. Because the incarceration exception is plain on its 
face, this Court has no reason to resort to extraneous sources to 
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aid its statutory interpretation. See Grappendorf, 2007 UT 84, f 9; 
Moss, 2007 UT 99, f 13. 
A juvenile court judge committed Dillon Whitney to the State's 
legal custody for out-of-home placement, where he remained. Dillon 
death, and thus Plaintiffs injury, arose out of that custody and Dillon's 
incarceration in a place of legal confinement. The State retains its 
sovereign immunity and Defendants are accordingly immune from suit. 
This Court should affirm the certified question. 
B. Dillon Whitney Remained Under State Control and 
Could Not Be Released Without Permission and a 
Juvenile Court Order. 
This Court has long-held that a person need not be imprisoned or 
confined to a jail to be incarcerated in a place of legal confinement. For 
more than thirty years, the touchstone of incarceration is being "under 
the control of the State," Madsen v. State, 583 P.2d 92, 93 (Utah 1978), 
and unable to "be released without some kind of permission." Emery v. 
State, 483 P.2d 1296, 1297 (Utah 1971). The Court has never wavered 
from that test. 
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hi Kmerx ,( m.tjnnh of I In' ( \«mi first determined that when read 
in tolal "the words 'other place of legal confinement' obviously referred 
to something w!,lu-r than a 'jail' or 'state prison.'" Id. at 1297. There, the 
(. 'on 11 found that the phrase included a plaintiffs placement at the state 
hospital, where despite her initial, voluntary admission, she could not 
"be released without some kind of permission." Id. The Court stated 
We think the legislature had no intention of 
waiving sovereign immunity in this case where a 
hospital attendant or guard is involved any more 
than it did where a nurse in prison or a jailer is 
involved, and in logic and sense it seems that to 
treat the two differently would reflect a departure 
from legislative intent, simply by playing upon 
the adjectives 'voluntary' and 'involuntary,' when 
it is obvious that there was a 'confinement' at the 
time of injury . . . . 
Id. 
Plaintiff makes the same argument, I hi nigh v\ it h different 
semantics. Here, and in pari, I'hinl iff asks l he ( 'ourt lo give undue 
weight lo the lerm "sonnr'1 voi si is "nun^erui e." But whether securely 
placed at the Journey Knnch or the SLVDC, or placed in a community-
-14-
based proctor home, "there was a 'confinement' at the time of 
[Plaintiffs] injury." Id. 
And perhaps more to the point, Justice Ellett stated in his dissent, 
that while a hospital meant to treat the mentally ill should not be 
considered a place of legal confinement, "such other places as the 
Industrial School and detention homes where delinquent minors are 
detained" should. Id. at 1298, Ellett, J dissenting (emphasis added). 
The legislature's intent being clear, Defendants have retained their 
sovereign immunity here. 
Five years after Emery, the Court revisited the incarceration 
exception in Epting v. State, 546 P.2d 242, 243 (Utah 1976). There, the 
Court upheld a trial court's order dismissing an action brought by the 
surviving children of a woman killed by an escaped prisoner. Ruling in 
the alternative, the Court observed that even though the assailant was 
released from prison each morning, driven to a work release site, and 
then picked up each evening for transport back to the prison, he "was 
still under the control of the prison authorities so that his conduct 
would 'arise out of the incarceration of any person.'" Id.; see also Kirk v. 
-15-
State, 7M R:-,il l:>f>.r>, 1257 (Utah 1989) (findingunderEpting, that 
escapee who shot ;md killed attorney at the courthouse had either 
"totally escaped the control of the prison . . . or he was still under the 
control of the prison authorities . . . in which latter instance the prison 
is immune from suit.") (emphasis in original). Dillon Whitney 
resembles the prison inmate, who, like Dillon, was not under 24-hour 
supervision while on work release, but who, like Dillon, remained under 
state control and thus incarcerated in a place of legal confinement. 
Next, in Madsen v. State, 583 P.2d 92 (Utah 1978), the Court 
examined whether a state prisoner's death arose out of his 
incarceration. Eschewing a narrow interpretation of the Immunity Act, 
this Court found that "[tjhe plain meaning of the [incarcera •••• • 
reflects a legislative intent to retain sovereign imn. ty\ 
occurring while the person is in prison and u ndcr 
State" Id. (emphasis added). 
The Court most recently upheld the State 
exception in Peck v. State, 200( ' > 
Court preserved the State's immunii ! ..:: 
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time Peck fell and was injured, he was neither imprisoned nor in jail. 
Id., 2008 UT 39, f 8. The Court determined that a person who had been 
"arrested, handcuffed, and told to stand in front of the police cruiser [, 
c]leary . . . was 'under the control of the State' and unable to 'be 
released without some kind of permission.'" Id. (quoting Madsen, 583 
P.3d at 93 and Emery, 483 P.2d at 1297). Under those circumstances, 
and despite a lack of actual confinement, the Court determined that 
Peck was incarcerated for purposes of the Act, id., and also that Peck's 
injury arose out of and was connected to that control. Id. at f 14. 
Plaintiff and the district court rejected that authority in prior 
proceedings. They relied instead, on dicta and an incomplete reading of 
a Utah Court of Appeals decision in Pace v. St. George City Police Dep't, 
2006 UT App 494, 153 P.3d 789; see Aplt. App. 134-137, Doc. 80, Memo. 
Dec. at pp. 6-9. But read in harmony with this Court's precedents, even 
Pace supports Defendants' immunity. 
In Pace, the plaintiff sued the St. George Police Department after 
her husband killed himself while under arrest and in police custody, but 
prior to being booked or placed in jail. Id., 2006 UT App 494, <R6. The 
-17-
plaintiff argued Ilia! 11 H • trial rnnrt erred by dismissing her complaint, 
< laiming the ('ily was imt immune because her husband was never 
"incarcerated." Id. The Court of Appeals observed that "the Immunity 
Act docs not define incarceration," and accordingly set out dictionary 
definitions of the words "incarcerate" and "confinement." Previously, 
Plaintiff rested her contentions on those definitions. 
I : .! Plaintiff, the Court of Appeals also observed in that 
c. i lefinitions aside, that this Court had previously "interpreted 
i .« -;\'J1 luii to mean 'being under the control of the S ta te , ' . . . or that 
a person 'cannot be released without some kind of permission." Id. 
(quoting first Madsen, 583 P.2d at 93 and then Emery, 483 P.2d at 
1297). Adopting that definition, the Court of Appeals correctly 
determined "the record undisputedly shows that at - ;!.;-.>. • -\ 
killed himself, he was under police control and cou. • :•> •• is* • 
without some kind of permission,' 
Pace's death occurred 'in - >.. 'place of 
legal confinemen' . . . = • - .
 ( •,..-, immune from the 
plaintiff s sun • i ami quotation marks omitted). 
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Like the decedent in Pace - and the actors in Emery, Epting, 
Madsen, and Peck - Dillon Whitney was in the State's legal custody 
and under the State's control - Dillon had been adjudicated by the 
juvenile court as delinquent and committed by that court to DHS's 
custody for appropriate out-of-home placement. See Aplt. App. 20-21, 
Amd. Compl. at M 25-27, 30-31, 34. And like those actors, Dillon 
Whitney was not free to return home or to be released from DHS's legal 
custody "without some kind of permission." Instead, Dillon Whitney's 
very ability to return home to visit with his father, required a court 
order and express approval from a juvenile court judge. See Aplt. App. 
23, Amd. Compl. at f% 47-50. Dillon Whitney was incarcerated when he 
fell down a flight of seventeen stairs, and later, when he succumbed to 
his injuries. This Court should conclude that the State has retained its 
immunity from Plaintiffs suit. 
C. Utah's Youth Corrections Act Supports Defendants' 
Sovereign Immunity. 
Judge Valdez removed Dillon Whitney from home and committed 
him to the State's legal custody because he was a delinquent child, a 
-19-
"youili itf'f'endcr .subjrcl lo the IITUIS and conditions of Utah Code Ann. 
§ W: V ; 1(11 cf ^rq. < West Supp. 2009); see also id. § 78A-6-117 (setting 
out ,ill.crnn1iu dispositions). A youth offender is "a person 12 years of 
age or older, and who has not reached 21 years of age, committed or 
admitted by the juvenile court to the custody, care, and jurisdiction of 
[DJJS] for confinement in a secure facility or supervision in the 
community, following adjudication for a delinquent act which would 
constitute a felony or misdemeanor if committed by an adult.,' Id. § 
62A-7-10K26) (emphasis added). 
Like the Immunity Act - which does not differentiate between 
minor and adults, but applies to the incarceration of any person in any 
place of legal confinement - the Youth Corrections Act does not 
differentiate by degrees of offense, or between the legal chaiu- ; i 
youth offender's confinement at a "secure facilil i /-
based placement." Id. at § 62A • n - n i\e-
available to a juvenile . uiicc 
committed l,o I')< J J S < . \ :< , emains subject to 
DJJS's ongoing supervision, rehabilitation and control. 
-20-
In her complaint, Plaintiff emphasized that Dillon had more 
liberty while in proctor care than he had known at Journey Ranch or 
the SLVDC. But Dillon never possessed the liberty to pack up and 
move home: 
Youth in the custody or temporary custody of the 
division are controlled or detained in a manner 
consistent with public safety and rules 
promulgated by the division. In the event of an 
unauthorized leave from a secure facility, 
detention center, community-based program, 
receiving center, home, or any other designated 
placement, division employees have the authority 
and duty to locate and apprehend the youth, or to 
initiate action with law enforcement agencies for 
assistance. 
Id. § 62A-7-104(6). 
Though not behind prison bars, DJJS "controlled" Dillon Whitney 
"in a manner consistent with public safety." Id. '"Control' means the 
authority to detain, restrict, and supervise a youth in a manner 
consistent with public safety and the well being of the youth and 
division employees." Id. § 62A-7-10K4) (emphasis added). 
When the Court steps back, "and look[s] at the entire 
incarceration exception," that exception covers Plaintiffs injury here. 
-21-
Peck, 2008 UT 39, f 13. A causal link exists between Plaintiffs injury 
and Dillon Whitney's commitment to proctor care. 
Namely, Dillon Whitney was arrested and referred to a Utah 
juvenile court because he committed acts which would have constituted 
crimes if he were an adult. Aplt App. 20, Amd. Compl. ff 25-26. That 
court adjudicated Dillon as delinquent and committed him to DHS's 
legal custody, directing DJJS to assume physical custody of Dillon for 
placement first, at a wilderness diversion program; next, at the SLVDC, 
and finally, at a community-based, proctor home. Id., Amd. Compl. ff 
27, 30, 34. Throughout, Dillon resided in the State's custody and 
outside Plaintiffs home. Throughout, Dillon Whitney was under state 
control and unable to be released absent the juvenile court's approval. 
Thus even under the Youth Corrections Act, the causal link between 
Dillon Whitney's incarceration and Plaintiffs injury is apparent. See 
e.g., Peck, 2008 UT 39, f 13. Plaintiffs injury arose out of and is 
connected with Dillon Whitney's court-ordered placement. The Court 
should affirm the question now before it. 
-22-
CONCLUSION 
A delinquent committed to a community-based proctor home is 
subject to state control and cannot be released absent a juvenile court 
order. That delinquent, then, is incarcerated in a place of legal 
confinement, such that the State has not waived its sovereign immunity 
for injuries causally connected to that placement. This Court should 
affirm the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals' certified question. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 15th day of June, 2011. 
BRIDGET* K. ROMANO (6979) 
AssistWt Utah Attorney General 
Mark L. Shurtleff (4666) 
Utah Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor 
PO Box 140856 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0856 
Telephone: (801) 366-0100 
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ADDENDUM A 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH 
CENTRAL DIVISION 
DONNA WHITNEY and DESTRY 
WHITNEY, individually and as parents 
and heirs of DILLON WHITNEY, 
deceased, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUVENILE 
JUSTICE SERVICES, a subdivision of 
the State of Utah; UTAH 
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN 
SERVICES, a subdivision of the State of 
Utah, STATE OF UTAH; QUEST 
YOUTH SERVICES, LLC, a Utah 
corporation; KYLE LANCASTER, DAN 
MALDONADO, JASON KAUFUSI; 
HENRY KAUFUSI; and DOES 1-10, 
Defendants. 
This matter is before the court on (1) a Motion to Dismiss filed by the State of Utah, the 
Department of Juvenile Justice Services, and the Utah Department of Human Services 
(collectively referred to as "the State Defendants"); (2) Plaintiff Donna Whitney and Destry 
Whitneys's ("Plaintiffs") Motion for Certification to the Utah Supreme Court; and (3) Plaintiffs' 
Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint.1 A hearing was held on August 26, 
1
 On October 17, 2009, Plaintiff Destry Whitney, Dillon's Whitney's father, filed a 
Stipulation of Dismissal, dismissing with prejudice his claims against all Defendants. See 
Docket #73. The court entered an Order dismissing Mr. Whitney's claims on November 6, 2009. 
See Docket #79. Therefore, only Donna Whitney's claims remain against the Defendants, 
although the court will refer to "Plaintiffs" throughout this Memorandum Decision and Order. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
AND ORDER 
Case No. 2:09CV30DAK 
2009. At the hearing, Plaintiffs were represented by Robert D. Strieper. The State Defendants 
were represented by Joni J. Jones, and Defendants Quest Youth Services, Jason Kaufusi, and 
Henry Kaufusi were represented by James C. Lewis. The court has carefully considered the 
memoranda and other materials submitted by the parties. Since taking the matter under 
advisement, the court has further considered the law and facts relating to this motion. The court 
has also considered Plaintiffs' Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition, which was filed on 
August 28, 2009, and the State Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiffs Supplemental 
Memorandum, which was filed on September 8, 2009. Now being fully advised, the court 
renders the following Memorandum Decision and Order. 
I. PLAINTIFFS' ALLEGATIONS2 
Sixteen-year-old Dillon Whitney was charged with several crimes from late 2006 through 
early 2007. As a result of Dillon's delinquent conduct, the Honorable Andrew A. Valdez placed 
Dillon on Probation and within the care and custody of the Department of Juvenile Justice 
Services ("DJJS") for placement in a wilderness diversion program with Journey Ranch. 
On June 5, 2007 Dillon became separated and lost for five hours during an overnight 
"trek" with Journey Ranch. Journey Ranch, believing Dillon was an unauthorized leave risk, or 
an "AWOL risk," recommended that Dillon be removed from Journey to be placed in a more 
"secure facility" where he could be "under surveillance at all times." On June 9, 2007 Dillon was 
removed from Journey and placed in custody at the Salt Lake Valley detention center. 
On June 22, 2007, Judge Valdez ordered Dillon, who was still in the care and custody of 
2
 When deciding a Motion to Dismiss, the court is required to accept as true the 
allegations in Plaintiffs' Complaint. The allegations set forth below are merely allegations and 
may or may not be factually accurate. 
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DJJS, to be followed by DJJS for observation and assessment, with ultimate plans for DJJS to 
arrange a community-based placement. On August 15, 2007, Judge Valdez, based upon the 
advice of individuals at DJJS, ordered DJJS to place Dillon in a community-based placement. 
On August 15, 2007, DJJS entrusted Jason Kaufusi ("J. Kaufusi") of Quest Youth 
Services ("Quest") to place Dillon in a safe and secure proctor home and to track Dillon's 
progress. J. Kaufusi placed Dillon at the "proctor home" of his brother, Proctor Henry Kaufusi 
("Proctor H. Kaufusi"). According to Plaintiffs, DJJS's employees lost track and control of 
Dillon after he was placed in the proctor home. On three separate occasions in early September 
2007, a caseworker attempted to contact Dillon, but failed to make contact after being given the 
excuse by J. Kaufusi that "it is hard to get hold of him [Dillon] after school." 
On September 12, 2007, Dillon had a hearing for a joyriding offense. During this 
hearing, a DJJS representative met with and informed Dillon that he would have a new 
caseworker "within a month or so." On September 25, 2007 a DJJS representative informed J. 
Kaufusi that Dillon would be assigned a new caseworker on October 6, 2007. On October 18, 
2007, the new caseworker telephoned J. Kaufusi to introduce himself. On October 30, 2007, 
Dillon learned of his new caseworker when J. Kaufusi arranged the meeting and introduced the two. 
On November 16, 2007, the new caseworker met with Dillon for a second-and last-time to provide 
Dillon with his contact information. 
During the November 16, 2007 visit, the caseworker decided that Dillon was ready for home 
visitations and motioned the court to approve them. That same day, Judge Valdez approved the 
home visits based upon the caseworker's motion. The caseworker informed J. Kaufusi about the 
order approving home visits, and the caseworker said he would approve the homevisits as long as 
3 
Dillon continued to do well in his placement. The caseworker also informed J. Kaufusi that he could 
make the determination on home visits as long as J. Kaufusi kept the caseworker updated. 
Subsequently, J. Kaufusi approved a home visit for Thanksgiving Day, November 22, 2007, and 
Friday, November 23, 2007, until 9:00 P.M. 
On Friday, November 23, 2007, Proctor H. Kaufusi twice called his brother, J. Kaufusi, at 
Quest to inform him that Dillon had not returned home. J, Kaufusi, who was in St. George, Utah for 
the weekend, made one futile attempt to notify Dillon's dad, Destry Whitney, that Dillon was AWOL 
and had not returned to the proctor's home. J. Kaufusi also stated that he had left a message on the 
caseworker's phone telling him that Dillon was AWOL, having not yet returned to the proctor 
home. 
On Saturday, November 24, 2007, an AWOL Dillon and some friends were at the 
apartment of Victor Hernandez. At some point, Dillon fell down a flight of seventeen stairs at 
Mr. Hernandez's apartment. Dillon's friends and Mr. Hernandez helped Dillon get back to Mr. 
Hernandez's apartment and placed Dillon on a couch. The following day, Mr. Hernandez, 
believing Dillon had died, put Dillon out in the stairwell. On Sunday, November 25, 2007, 
someone discovered Dillon in the stairwell and called paramedics, who arrived at around 7:00 
A.M. Dillon Whitney died en-route to Salt Lake Regional Hospital as a result of blunt force 
trauma to his head. 
According to Plaintiffs, during the time Dillon was missing, no one from the State of 
Utah, DJJS, or Quest searched for him or reported him missing to any authority who could locate 
him, as authorized by Utah Law U.C.A. §62A-7-104(10)(a). Also, Plaintiffs claim that the 
proctor home consisted of a basement and upstairs. Proctor H. Kaufusi and his two children 
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lived upstairs while the basement was converted to house the proctored children. Dillon was 
placed in the basement of the proctor home with one other proctored child. Allegedly, Proctor 
H. Kaufusi allowed the proctored children to come and go at will, and Plaintiffs allege that he 
allowed the proctored children to violate their respective court orders, the laws of the State of 
Utah, and the policy and procedures of DJJS. 
II. THE PENDING MOTIONS 
In this lawsuit, Plaintiffs have sued Defendants on various negligence theories generally 
stemming from an alleged breach of their duty to ensure that Dillon was in a secure, controlled 
environment, and for civil rights violations under a 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
The State Defendants have filed a motion to dismiss the § 1983 claims and the negligence 
claims against them. Specifically, the State Defendants seek dismissal of the 1983 claims 
because the State is not a "person" under § 1983. The State Defendants also seek dismissal of 
the negligence claims against them because, they argue, under the Utah Governmental Immunity 
Act, immunity is not waived for negligence if the alleged negligence arises out of one's 
incarceration. Therefore, the State Defendants argue, the "incarceration exception" to the general 
waiver of immunity for negligence precludes Plaintiffs' negligence claims. 
Plaintiffs, however, argue that Dillon was not "incarcerated," and, thus, the incarceration 
exception does not apply in this case. They also argue that the Utah Governmental Immunity Act 
is unconstitutional for a variety of reasons. Alternatively, Plaintiffs argue that, to the extent the 
court finds ambiguity concerning whether the incarceration exception would apply in these 
circumstances, the court should certify this question to the Utah Supreme Court. Plaintiffs have 
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also filed a Second Motion for Leave to File a Second Amended Complaint. 
III. DISCUSSION 
A. STATE DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS 
1. § 1983 Claims 
The State Defendants first argue that they are not persons for purposes of Section 1983, 
and therefore, the civil rights claims against them must be dismissed. "Neither the state, nor a 
governmental entity that is an arm of the state for Eleventh Amendment purposes, nor a state 
official who acts in his or her official capacity, is a "person" within the meaning of § 1983." 
Harris v. Champion, 51 F.3d 901, 905-06 (10th Cir. 1995). The court agrees, and Plaintiffs do 
not dispute, that the § 1983 claims against the State Defendants must be dismissed. 
2. Negligence Claims 
The State Defendants contend that Plaintiffs' negligence claims are barred by the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act ("UGIA").3 Generally, immunity from suit is waived as to any 
injury proximately caused by a negligent act or omission of an employee committed within the 
scope of employment. See Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-301(4) (2008). The question presented by 
the instant motion is whether an exception to the waiver of immunity applies. The State 
Defendants claim that the "incarceration" exception applies in this case, compelling the dismissal 
of the negligence claims against them. 
The UGIA retains immunity for negligence claims if the injury "arises out of, in 
connection with, or results from . . . incarceration of any person in any state prison, county or 
3
 There is no dispute that the State Defendants are governmental entities performing 
governmental functions. 
6 
city jail, or other place of legal confinement" Id. § 63G-7-301(5)(j) (emphasis added). State 
Defendants rely on several Utah cases for the proposition that the incarceration exception applies 
in this case, barring the negligence claims against them. In Epting v. Utah, 546 P.2d 246, 244 
(Utah 1976), for example, plaintiffs sued the State when their mother was killed by an inmate 
who had escaped from the state prison. The inmate had escaped from a work-release program 
when he killed the plaintiffs' mother. The court held that the placing of a prisoner in a work 
release program was the exercise of a discretionary function, for which defendants enjoyed 
immunity. As to the incarceration exception, the court also observed: 
As to the status of [the inmate] vis-a-vis Defendants' prison, there 
seems to be just two alternatives, either: (a) he had totally escaped 
the control of the prison and was thus acting on his own so the 
prison was not responsible for him; or (b) he was still under the 
control of the prison authorities so that his conduct would "arise 
out of the incarceration of any person in (the) state prison . . . " in 
which latter instance the prison is immune from suit under the 
statute. 
Id. at 244; Kirk v. State, 784 P.2d 1255 (Utah 1989) (applying the incarceration exception to a 
situation where a prisoner shot and injured the plaintiff during a court appearance). The court 
finds that these cases are distinguishable from the case at bar because the both Kirk and Epting 
involved individuals who were sentenced to serve time in prison and were therefore 
"incarcerated" as that term is commonly understood. 
The State Defendants also rely on Emery v. State, 483 P.2d 1296, 1297 (1971), a case in 
which the Utah Supreme Court found that the incarceration exception barred a negligence claim 
when the decedent had voluntarily admitted herself to the Utah State Hospital. While this case is 
not as easily distinguishable as Kirk and Epting, a close reading of the court's reasoning reveals 
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that Emery, too, is distinguishable from the instant case. In Emery, the court analyzed the statute 
pertaining to the state hospital and determined that the state hospital was a place of "legal 
confinement," even though the decedent had voluntarily requested to be admitted, because a 
specific provision in the statute that allowed for the possibility of the decedent being held against 
her will. Id. at 1297. Specifically, once a voluntary patient requested to be released, the patient 
was required to wait forty-eight hours to permit sufficient time for the superintendent of the 
hospital to file a motion with a court to prevent the release. If a court granted such a motion, 
there would be no release, and the patient could be confined against his will. Id. The court 
determined that a "voluntary" patient was as much confined as was an "involuntary" patient until 
certain steps were taken to obtain a release. Id. at 1298. Thus, the court found that the 
incarceration exception applied in that case. 
In this case, Plaintiffs argue that the incarceration exception is inapplicable because 
Dillon was not incarcerated in a legal place of confinement but was instead placed in a 
community-based program. They contend that the situation in this case is more analogous to a 
foster-care placement than to being "incarcerated." Then, they argue that Utah courts have 
repeatedly recognized valid claims against the State for negligent placement of children in foster 
care. 
Having reviewed the case law concerning the incarceration exception to the waiver of 
governmental immunity for negligence, the case law on negligence claims against the state 
pertaining to foster-care placement, and the statutory language of the Juvenile Justice Services 
statute, the court agrees with Plaintiffs that the incarceration exception to the waiver of 
governmental immunity does not apply in this case. 
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The Court of Appeals of Utah has stated that to incarcerate "is to imprison or to confine." 
Pace v. St. George City Police Dept. 2006 UT App 494, U 6, 153 P.3d 789, 790. (2006). 
In setting forth the laws pertaining to Juvenile Justice Services, the Utah legislature set forth that 
youth offenders are either placed in "confinement in a secure facility or supervised in the 
community." Utah Code Ann. § 62A-7-101(26) (2006 & Supp. 2008) (emphasis added). A 
"secure facility" means any facility operated by or under contract with the division, that provides 
24-hour supervision and confinement for youth offenders committed to the division for custody 
and rehabilitation. Id. § 62A-7-101(20). In contrast, a "community-based program" as defined 
by the legislature, "means a nonsecure residential or nonresidential program designated to 
supervise and rehabilitate youth offenders in the least restrictive setting, consistent with public 
safety, and designated or operated by or under contract with the division." Id. § 62A-7-101(3). 
Here, the juvenile court judge specifically chose not to confine Dillon to a secure facility 
but to place him in a community-based program, where he would be supervised and rehabilitated 
"in the least restrictive setting, consistent with public safety." Id. The court cannot conclude 
that Dillon was "incarcerated" in a place of "legal confinement" for purposes of the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act. Therefore, the State Defendants are not entitled to immunity under 
the incarceration exception to the waiver of governmental immunity for negligence.4 
B. PLAINTIFFS' OTHER MOTIONS 
Plaintiffs have also requested that, if the court does not agree with their position, then the 
court should certify the issue to the Utah Supreme Court. This request is moot in light of the 
4
 Because of the court's determination on this issue, the court need not address Plaintiffs' 
arguments based on the alleged unconstitutionality of the UGIA. 
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court's determination above. 
In addition, Plaintiffs have requested leave to file a Second Amended Complaint, seeking 
to add two causes of action: Violation of Civil Rights Pursuant to Utah State Constitution Article 
I Section 7; and (2) they also seek to add the estate of Dillon Whitney as a party. 
The court will permit Plaintiffs to add the estate of Dillon Whitney as a party and will 
also permit Plaintiffs to add their civil rights claim based on the Utah Constitution. The court 
finds that the Notice of Claim was sufficient to encompass such a claim. 
IV, CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that 
(1) The State Defendants' Motion to Dismiss [Docket # 28] is GRANTED in part and 
DENIED in part. The claims brought against the State Defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 
1983 are DISMISSED, but the negligence claims against the State Defendants remain; 
(2) Plaintiffs' Motion for Certification to the Utah Supreme Court [Docket #37] is 
DENIED AS MOOT; and 
(3) Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint [Docket #44] is 
GRANTED. 
DATED this 25th day of November, 2009. 
BY THE COURT: 
^<%'kJLaz 
DALE A. KIMBALL 
United States District Judge 
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